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NOTHING TO FEAR: ESTABLISHING AN EQUALITY
OF RIGHTS FOR CRIME VICTIMS THROUGH
THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS AMENDMENT
RACHELLE K. HONG*
INTRODUCTION
Crime and violence are ever-present concerns in American
society, and these concerns are not unfounded. In 1999, a vio-
lent crime occurred in the United States once every twenty-two
seconds.' A murder occurred once every thirty-four minutes, a
forcible rape every six minutes and an aggravated assault every
thirty-four seconds.' While crime rates are on the decline, these
statistics remain startling, and reinforcement of the sad truth
occurs every time we read the newspaper or view the evening
news. On an international scale, the rate of lethal violence in the
United States is inordinately higher than that of nations with
comparable social and economic characteristics. The rate of
homicide among Group of Seven (G-7) countries,' for example,
is 9.4 per 100,000 people in America, compared to 2.6 in Italy
(the second highest rate) and 0.6 in Japan (the lowest rate).' If
violence were the result of only a single cause, and that cause
could be pinpointed as well as successfully combated, the prob-
lem would cease to exist. But realistically, American violence is
the result of a combination of factors, which may include, among
others, the use of firearms in assaults and robberies, the use and
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1. FBI, 1999 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT (UCR), § 1, fig. 2.1 (2000), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/99cius.htm (on file with JLEPP).
2. Id.
3. G-7 countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The G-7 formed in the early 1970s to
respond to the instability of the world's currencies. G-7 countries have been
referred to as "the top industrialized countries of the world." Joan Veon, Who
are the Group of Seven?, at http://www.ninehundred.net/-jveon/G-7REPOR.
html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001).
4. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRNG & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 55, fig. 4.3 (1997).
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marketing of illicit drugs and the extensive portrayal of violence
by the mass media.5
Besides giving rise to the seemingly endless theories about
possible preventative measures, American violence spurs schol-
ars, legislators and U.S. citizens to critically analyze how our crim-
inal justice system deals with violence after the fact. The
particular focus of this Note is to analyze our criminal justice sys-
tem and the perspective of the victim, specifically as they relate to
the proposed Victims' Rights Amendment ("VRA") to the United
States Constitution.
The problem of victim neglect in our criminal justice system
is the motivation behind the enactment of the VRA. Victims
going through the criminal process feel neglected and further
victimized due to a number of factors including sequestration
from attending their offenders' trials, not having the option to
be heard at proceedings and not being notified by courts and
attorneys of criminal proceedings and criminal releases from cus-
tody. The following statements by two different crime victims are
indicative of the victim's plight: "One morning I woke up, looked
out my bedroom window and saw the man who had assaulted me
standing across the street staring at me. I thought he was in jail;"
and "To be a victim at the hands of the criminal is an unforgetta-
ble nightmare. But to then become a victim at the hands of the
criminal justice system is an unforgivable travesty. It makes the
criminal and the criminal justice system partners in crime."6
To be more successful in our pursuits for justice, the voice of
the victim needs to be reintroduced to the criminal justice system
that so deeply affects the victim's life. The VRA addresses the
fundamental right to be free from neglect and further victimiza-
tion by the criminal justice system. The implementation of this
federal amendment would rightfully acknowledge that after a
crime occurs, society, through the criminal justice system, faces
not only a duty to punish the wrongdoer but also a duty to
ensure that victims obtain the role in the punitive process that
they deserve.
The goal of this Note is to explain why the VRA is a neces-
sary and positive change for both the crime victim and American
criminal law. This Note first provides a background of the vic-
tim's rights movement and the VRA. Next, it explains how the
respect society should have for victims, the victimization caused
5. See generally id. Part III of Zimring and Hawkins' book is entitled "Cor-
relates and Causes" and provides an in-depth analysis of each of these factors.
6. PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE ON VICrIMS OF CRIME: FINAL REPORT 4, 9
(1982) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
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by the criminal justice system itself and the imbalance of rights
between the victim and the accused each confirm society's need
for the VRA. Finally, this Note illustrates that fears about the
VRA are unfounded, and that adding restitutionary and retribu-
tive aspects to our criminal justice system through the VRA's fed-
eral guarantees will restore the victim's equality of rights, thereby
enhancing our punitive process.
I. A BACKGROUND OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND THE
VICTIMS' RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Victims once had an active participatory role in American
criminal proceedings, but over time, this role diminished. Con-
sequently, victims' rights groups formed in the 1970s and 1980s.
Their motivation was concern that the criminal justice system
neglected victims. This section of the Note presents the history
of how these groups fostered victim awareness in society and pro-
pelled the current movement for a constitutional amendment
protecting victims' rights.
A. Colonial Victims' Rights
While America's victims may feel a sense of neglect in
today's criminal system, this was not always the situation. Colo-
nists brought the principles of English common law, including
private criminal prosecutions, with them to the New World. Pri-
vate prosecutions provided victims of felonies the active role of
not only initiating, but also prosecuting their offenders on their
own, without a public prosecutor.7 This practice was "wide-
spread" in colonial America, and some legal scholars have
debated whether our Founding Fathers purposefully failed to
codify victims' rights formally in the Constitution because victims
already obtained an active and acknowledged role in the crimi-
nal justice system.'
7. Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales ofJustice: The Case for and the Effects of
Utah's Victims'Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1380 (1994). See also
Steven J. Twist, The Crime Victims' Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect
Things (Statement before the Senate Judiciary Comm.), at http://judiciary.sen-
ate.gov/32499sjt.htm (Apr. 20, 2000). Twist says that the practice of private
prosecution originated in early English common law and was commonplace in
America during colonial times and when the Constitution was drafted. Even
today, private prosecutions are practiced in England.
8. Cassell, supra note 7, at 1380. See also Prepared Testimony of Christine
Long Victims' Rights Comm. Chair and Natl Dir. Law Enforcement Alliance of
America, Before the House Judiciary Comm. Constitution Subcomm., FED. NEws SERV.,
Feb. 10, 2000 [hereinafter Long Testimony]. But see Rachel King, Why a Vic-
tims' Rights Constitutional Amendment is a Bad Idea: Practical Experiences from Crime
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B. Modernization of the Criminal Justice System Leads to a Focus
on the Accused
As the criminal system evolved over time, private prosecu-
tions and the victim's role diminished. Public prosecution
became the norm and the victim's status faded.9 Today, victims'
advocates strongly voice the opinion that the design of our cur-
rent system "protect[s] the rights of the criminally accused, while
relegating the role of the victim to a procedurally necessary
'evil.'" They also state that "[t]he result is clear-any crime vic-
tims feel shut out of the system, often left to fend for them-
selves."1" This sense of abandonment makes the victim's role
akin to that of an outsider who happened to be present at the
scene of a crime. As former Attorney General of the United
States, Herbert Brownell, explained:
[A] [c] omplainant in the United States has no standing in
the criminal action, which is prosecuted solely in the name
of the "State" or the "People." In New York a complainant
is no more or no less than any other material witness, hav-
ing no control over the prosecution. He can be jailed for
failure to cooperate."1
Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 366-68 (2000), in which King argues that it is
debatable whether or not the American criminal system was public or private at
the time of our Constitution's creation. King says:
It is true that during colonial times criminal law was handled in part by
private prosecution.... Instead of asserting that all prosecutions were
public or private, it is more accurate to say that during colonial times,
criminal law was a combination of both public and private
prosecution.
Id. at 367. King refutes the argument that the drafters would necessarily have
included a victims' rights amendment if public prosecutions existed. Id. at
367-68.
9. See Cassell, supra note 7, at 1380 n.24 (referring to LAWRENCE M. FIED-
MAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 21 (1993)). Friedman
explains that colonists brought the English common law system with them to
the New World, and this system included private prosecution. "English law had
no district attorney, no public prosecutor. If you were a shopkeeper, and you
caught a thief robbing your store, it was your responsibility to bring him to jus-
tice... the money for the prosecution would have to come out of your pocket."
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29-30
(1993).
Gradually, the idea of public responsibility for prosecution evolved, largely
influenced by the motivation of municipal leaders and religion. Friedman
observes that "[t]he commandments of God's justice were too important to be
left to the whims, and the pocketbooks, of individual victims." Id. at 30.
10. C.J. Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The Proposed Crime Vic-
tims'Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 BAYLOR
L. Ruv. 1, 2 (1997).
11. HERBERT BROWNELL, THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF CRIME 11 (1976).
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Victims may report criminal activity and serve as a witness at
trial, but the criminal system leaves their intimate and often life-
altering experiences unacknowledged because fundamental
rights such as notice of criminal proceedings, the right to be pre-
sent at proceedings and the right to be informed when one's
offender is released or has escaped from prison have no constitu-
tional guarantee.
C. Contemporary Reform Efforts
Against this backdrop, victims began to garner public atten-
tion and support, and the VRA gained momentum. In the 1970s,
state and federal legislatures enacted statutes addressing victims'
rights, including restitution and the possibility of participating in
their offenders' prosecution, sentencing and parole. 2 In 1981,
President Ronald Reagan attempted to increase victim awareness
by declaring "Victims' Rights Week" the week of April 19th.1'
A landmark in the victim's right movement happened in
1982, when President Reagan created the President's Task Force
on Victims of Crime ("Task Force"). The Task Force issued a
final report in December of that year to address our criminal sys-
tem's treatment of victims and to propose legislation establishing
victims' rights. This final report yielded an eye-opening conclu-
sion regarding the neglected victim and the need for sweeping
legislative reform to protect victims' rights. The spirit of the Task
Force's findings is captured in the words of its Chairman, Lois
Haight Herrington, who wrote the following as part of the
report:
Victims who do survive their attack, and are brave enough
to come forward, turn to their government expecting it to
do what a good government should-protect the innocent.
The American criminal justice system is absolutely depen-
dent on these victims to cooperate. Without the coopera-
tion of victims and witnesses in reporting and testifying
about crime, it is impossible in a free society to hold
criminals accountable. When victims come forward to per-
form this vital service, however, they find little protection.
They discover instead that they will be treated as append-
ages of a system appallingly out of balance. They learn that
somewhere along the way the system has lost track of the
simple truth that it is supposed to be fair and to protect
12. Jennifer J. Stearman, An Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States to Protect the Rights of Crime Victims: Exploring the Effectiveness of State Efforts,
30 U. BALT. L.F. 43, 44 (1999).
13. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 10, at 3.
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those who obey the law while punishing those who break it.
Somewhere along the way, the system began to serve law-
yers and judges and defendants, treating the victim with
institutionalized disinterest.1"
To remedy the startling state of the victim, the Task Force
proposed sixty-eight specific recommendations to governmental
entities as well as private and community organizations for action
on behalf of the victim.1 5 In addition to these recommendations,
the Task Force proposed that a sentence be added to the end of
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The proposed
amendment would provide constitutional protection for a vic-
tim's right to testify at court proceedings, an issue that has
remained a point of controversy to this day. The modified Sixth
Amendment would read:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of Counsel for his defense. Likewise, the victim, in every crimi-
nal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at
all critical stages of judicial proceedings.16
Today, this proposed modification to the Sixth Amendment
has not materialized, but the Task Force's proposal has proven to
be a crucial catalyst for the victim's rights movement, planting
the seed that created the current push for a VRA. The National
Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA) proposed an entirely
new amendment to the Constitution addressing victims' rights
shortly after the Task Force.1 7 Following NOVA, citizens formed
the National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network
(NVCAN) with the specific goal of obtaining a federal constitu-
tional amendment after first establishing constitutional amend-
ments in each state."8  NVCAN proposed the following
14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at vi.
15. See generally id. The Task Force made proposed recommendations to
the following groups, followed in parentheses by the number of recommenda-
tions: federal and state level action (12), federal action (6), police (4), prosecu-
tors (8), the judiciary (10), parole boards (4), hospitals (5), the ministry (2),
the bar (3), schools (4), the mental health community (5), the private sector
(4), proposed constitutional amendment (1). Id.
16. Id. at 114 (the italicized sentence represents the modification).
17. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 10, at 4-5.
18. Cassell, supra note 7, at 1382.
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amendment in November 1987: "The victim of crime or his or
her representative shall have the right to be informed of, to be
present at, and to be heard at all criminal justice proceedings at
which the defendant has such rights, subject to the same rules of
evidence which govern the defendant's rights."19
In order for the VRA to become a constitutional amend-
ment, it must be passed by two-thirds of the Senate, two-thirds of
the House of Representatives and then ratified by three-fourths
of the state legislatures.2 ° For the fourteen years after the Task
Force's Final Report, a federal VRA remained an issue, but the
legislature did not act seriously upon it until 1996, when the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives considered a Victims' Bill of
Rights Constitutional Amendment.2 1 While the 104th Congress
adjourned without further pursuing the amendment, its spon-
sors, Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) and John Kyl (R-Ariz.),
reintroduced it to the Senate of the 105th Congress on January
21, 1998; Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) reintroduced the
House version on April 15, 1997.22 Repeated hearings, altera-
tions to the proposal and votes occurred in both the Senate and
House for three terms (104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses).23
The version of the VRA before Congress until April 27, 2000, was
S.J. Res. 3, and its principal part is Section 1, below.
S.J. Res. 3
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to protect the rights of crime victims.
Section 1. A victim of a crime of violence, as these
terms may be defined by law, shall have the rights:
to reasonable notice of, and not to be excluded from,
any public proceedings relating to the crime;
to be heard, if present, and to submit a statement at all
such proceedings to determine a conditional release
from custody, an acceptance of a negotiated plea, or a
sentence;
to the foregoing rights at a parole proceeding that is
not public, to the extent those rights are afforded to
the convicted offender;
19. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 10, at 5.
20. U.S. CONST. art. V.
21. Stearman, supra note 12, at 45-46 (citing S.J. Res. 52 & H.R.J. Res.
174, 104th Cong. (1996)).
22. Id. at 46.
23. See generally id. (Stearman provides details of the congressional activ-
ity surrounding the VRA during these terms.).
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to reasonable notice of and an opportunity to submit a
statement concerning any proposed pardon or com-
mutation of a sentence;
to reasonable notice of a release or escape from cus-
tody relating to the crime;
to consideration of the interest of the victim that any
trial be free from unreasonable delay;
to an order of restitution from the convicted offender;
to consideration for the safety of the victim in deter-
mining any conditional release from custody relating
to the crime; and
to reasonable notice of the rights established by this
article.
24
S.J. Res. 3 was under consideration in the Senate in 2000.
The Senate began consideration of the VRA on April 25, 2000,
but withdrew it two days later.25 Prior to the withdrawal, scholars
and columnists strongly predicted that the Senate would "over-
whelmingly" pass the VRA, the House and state legislatures
24. S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. (1999). The remaining four sections of S.J.
Res. 3 are as follows:
Section 2. Only the victim or the victim's lawful representative shall
have standing to assert the rights established by this article. Nothing
in this article shall provide grounds to stay or continue any trial, reo-
pen any proceeding or invalidate any ruling, except with respect to
conditional release or restitution or to provide rights guaranteed by
this article in future proceedings, without staying or continuing a trial.
Nothing in this article shall give rise to or authorize the creation of a
claim for damages against the United States, a State, a political subdivi-
sion, or a public officer or employee.
Section 3. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation. Exceptions to the rights established by this
article may be created only when necessary to achieve a compelling
interest.
Section 4. This article shall take effect on the 180th day after the
ratification of this article. The right to an order of restitution estab-
lished by this article shall not apply to crimes committed before the
effective date of this article.
Section 5. The rights and immunities established by this article shall
apply in Federal and State proceedings, including military proceed-
ings to the extent that the Congress may provide by law, juvenile jus-
tice proceedings, and proceedings in the District of Columbia and any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.
25. 146 CONG. REc. 2,820 (2000) (introducing the VRA to the Senate
floor); 146 CONG. Rc. 2,966 (2000) (withdrawing the VRA from consideration
by the Senate).
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would follow, 26 and that "[t] he long and winding road to passage
of [the VRA] [was] finally nearing an end. '2 7 However, the Clin-
ton Administration's Department of Justice had four objections28
to S.J. Res. 3, three of which the VRA advocates agreed with, and
one that remains a bitter point of contention: the administration
wanted to add the language that "Nothing in this article shall be
construed to deny or diminish the rights of the accused guaran-
teed by the Constitution. "29 The VRA advocates disagreed with
this request and proposed alternative language that "[i] n cases of
conflict, the rights of the accused or convicted offender and the
victim shall be reasonably balanced."3 ' The administration
rejected this proposal. This disagreement was the most recent
roadblock for VRA advocates and came at a time when the
amendment was the closest it has ever been to being passed by
Congress. Senator Kyl voiced his frustration and explained:
It eventually boiled down to one thing that [the adminis-
tration] wanted that we simply couldn't give them-and
that was a statement that the defendant's rights would pre-
vail over the victim's rights in the event of a conflict....
The whole point of a crime victims rights amendment is to
elevate the crime victims' rights to the same constitutional
status as the defendant's rights.3 1
Today, the push for a VRA is still strong and Senators Kyl
and Feinstein are continuing their vigorous fight for its enact-
ment. Kyl and Feinstein have drafted a revised VRA, not yet in its
final form, which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. The rights of victims of violent crime being
vital to a system of ordered liberty and being capable of
protection without abridging the rights of those accused or
convicted of victimizing them, the rights of any such victim
to full consideration and fair treatment in the prosecution
26. Paul G. Cassell, The Victims' Rights Amendment, at http://www.fed-soc.
org/victimscrimv3i2.htm (Apr. 20, 2000) (on file with author).
27. Ellen Sung, Senate Weighs Bill of Rights for Victims, Policy.com, at http:/
/www.policy.com/news/dbrief/dbriefarc6l7.asp (Apr. 20, 1999) (on file with
author).
28. See Senate Sponsors Pull Victim Rights Amendment, NOVA Newsletter,
vol. 19, No. 2 and 3, at http://www.nvcan.org/nova0600.htm (June 2000) for
the Dep't of Justice's four specific objections to S.J. Res. 3.
29. Letter from Roberta Roper, Co-Chairperson, NVCAN, to President
Clinton, at http://www.nvcan.org/docs/clintonletter.htm (May 2, 2000) [here-
inafter NVCAN Letter to President Clinton] (on file with author); Senate Spon-
sors Pull Victim Rights Amendment, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. Bill Sammon & Dave Boyer, Gore Now Behind Amendment to Aid Victims
of Crimes, WASH. TimIrs, July 19, 2000, at A4.
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and punishment of crime shall not be abridged by any
State or the United States.
SECTION 2. Victims of violent crimes shall have the
rights to timely notice of any release, escape, and public
proceeding involving the crime; not to be excluded from
such proceedings; to be heard at release, plea, sentencing,
commutation, and pardon proceedings; and not to be sub-
jected to undue delay, or to decisions that disregard their
safety or their just claims to restitution; nor shall these
rights be restricted, except when, and to the degree that,
compelling necessity dictates.
SECTION 3. Nothing in this article shall be construed to
provide grounds for a new trial or to authorize any claim
for damages.
SECTION 4. Congress shall have the power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.32
Since this new version of the VRA guarantees essentially the
same victims' rights as S.J. Res. 3, but adds language in sections
one and three to clarify how these rights will affect new trials,
claims for damages and the rights of the accused, it is likely to
elicit the same widespread support of the previous version. This
support includes the backing of thirty-nine state Attorneys Gen-
eral, as well as national organizations including Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD), the National Governor's Association
(NGA), the National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) and
the International Union of Police Associations/AFL-CIO. 33
Kyl and Feinstein will most likely present their final version
of the revised VRA to Congress during its winter session, 2001-
2002. Steven Twist, Executive Committee member for NVCAN
and former Chief Attorney General of Arizona, believes this new
version's "chances of ultimate enactment are very good. ' 34 An
advantage for the passage of the amendment is that President
Bush "strongly supports" the VRA, as he articulated during the
2000 Presidential election. 35 Bush's appointment of John Ash-
croft to Attorney General is consistent with his campaign rheto-
32. Kyl/Feinstein to Introduce Revised Victims' Rights Amendment, at http://
www.nvcan.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
33. NVCAN VRA Supporters, at http://www.nvcan.org/endorse.htm (last
updated May 29, 2000). Visit this website for a list of national organizations,
national public officials, and State Attorneys General that support a VRA.
34. E-mail from Steven Twist to author (Sept. 13, 2001, 19:13:26 EST) (on
file with author).
35. Presidential Candidates Favor Victims' Constitutional Rights, at http://
www.nvcan.org (last modified Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with author).
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ic. Ashcroft helped enact a state crime victims' rights
amendment in Missouri, that he believes "would be enhanced by
a federal victims rights amendment."36 According to Ashcroft:
[I]f the Justice Department is to be focused on justice for
all Americans, there is a need for justice for those who
have been offended, as well as those who are the offenders.
And the victims rights amendment and the victims rights
movement is designed to help us have balance in this
respect.37
With a new Congress and Presidential administration to
work with, Senators Kyl and Feinstein have a fresh start and
renewed hopes on working towards the enactment of their
revised version of the VRA. If the Senators can maintain and
enhance the momentum of the support enjoyed by the previous
version of the VRA, their goal has a legitimate chance of
materializing.
II. WHY WE NEED A VRA
This section analyzes why we need a VRA. First, it explains
that victims deserve a VRA because of the harm they have suf-
fered and the benefits they can provide the legal and law
enforcement communities. Second, it illustrates the problem
that the criminal justice system itself is causing victims to
undergo a second form of victimization. Lastly, this section
explains that constitutional protection of victims' rights is an
effective and proper way to restore balance between victims and
their offenders.
A. Respect for Victims
In an analysis of eighteen countries in the late 1980s and
early 1990, researchers found that the United States has the sec-
ond highest rate of victimization for all property offenses, and it
also ranks second in robbery rates and fourth in assault rates.38
Besides the fears associated with personal assaults, thefts and bur-
glaries, a fear of tragedies on a larger scale is also legitimate.
American society was stunned by the aftermath of the Oklahoma
36. Day II, Morning Session of a Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Comm., FED.
NEWS SERV., Jan. 17, 2001.
37. Id.
38. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 35, 38, 39. The eighteen coun-
tries included in the survey were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia,
England, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ire-
land, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, the United States, and West
Germany.
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City bombing, the Columbine High School shooting, the Rodney
King police beating, the Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman murders and rioting after sporting events such as the
Los Angeles Lakers' 2000 NBA Championship victory.
We learn about these tragic events, and soon they become
memories in the backs of our minds. We refer to them, but they
do not always conjure up as strong emotions as they once did.
From the standpoint of a victim, however, these feelings remain
longer and are felt more deeply. As one victim's parents said,
"Our daughter's killer will be eligible for parole when he's 29.
For us there is no parole. Our family has been given-with no
due process of law-a life sentence of loss and grief."39 In
addressing the American system ofjustice, it is important to keep
the victim in mind because the harm he or she suffers is the very
reason that a case is at trial in the first place. The victim's experi-
ence should be intimately tied into the administration of justice.
Besides providing attention to victims because of the per-
sonal interests they have at stake, focusing on victims is beneficial
from both legal and law enforcement perspectives. Victims are
invaluable from a legal perspective because they serve as key wit-
nesses that are often crucial help to seeking justice at trials.
From a law enforcement perspective, evidence suggests that help-
ing victims may also help prevent crime. A study by the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency concluded that "the single
greatest factor in predicting criminal behavior on the part of
teenagers . . . [was] whether they had been a victim of crime."4"
As stated by Susan Herman, Executive Director of the National
Center for Victims of Crime:
It is in our interest as a nation to help victims of crime not
only because it's the right thing to do-not only because
our country would be healthier and more productive-but
because helping victims may turn out to be one of the most
effective ways to prevent further crime and violence.4 1
Thus, victims cannot avoid being affected by the criminal
justice system, and due to their unique role in crimes and crimi-
nal trials, they deserve not to be marginalized by the system. We
should ensure justice for these people and treat them with the
utmost respect, not only because of the violence committed
against them, but also for their roles in helping courts reach just
results and in helping communities become safer places to live.
39. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
40. Seeking Parallel Justice, VITAL SPEECHES, Feb. 1, 2001, at 250 (transcript
of Susan Herman address).
41. Id.
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The very fact that a victims' rights movement has gained such
strong momentum and widespread bipartisan support illustrates
that the victim is not being treated in the manner that he or she
deserves, and this fact is disturbing.
B. A Victim Twice Over
In 1988, Christine Long was raped. Her personal testimony
puts into perspective what VRA advocates are fighting to remedy.
This attacker invaded my most personal and sacred space
when he broke into my home and brutally raped me,
destroying every shred of my dignity and my notions of per-
sonal security. My subsequent experience with the crimi-
nal justice system left me feeling violated again by placing
greater value on the rights of the accused versus my rights.
I was treated not as a victim but instead as a mere witness,
as if I had only seen from afar the inhumane brutality
inflicted against me.
The system saw me as a piece of evidence, like a finger-
print or a photograph, not as a feeling, thinking human
being.42
Long's experience as a victim of violent crime was followed
by further victimization by the criminal justice system itself. She
explains, "My ordeal impressed upon me the total lack of crime
victims' rights. I had no right to be apprised of the plea bargain
negotiated with my assailant. And I had no right to voice my
objections at subsequent parole hearings."4 Because of the
gross neglect she perceived going through the criminal justice
system, Long has made it her life's goal to fight for victims' rights
and the VRA, speaking for the benefit of future victims as well as
for those who have also suffered from being a victim twice over.
The man who raped Long had previously been convicted of
rape and incarcerated. Had the VRA been enacted before
Long's rape, it is possible that her attack could have been pre-
vented. The rapist's earlier victims would have had a constitu-
tional guarantee to be heard through testimony or written
statements at proceedings determining the attacker's release
from custody, acceptance of negotiated pleas or sentencing.
They would also have had a constitutional right to consideration
for their safety, should their offender be released from custody.4 4
Granted, the assumption cannot be made that Long's rape would
42. Long Testimony, supra note 8.
43. Id.
44. S. J. Res. 3, supra note 24; see Kyl/Feinstein to Introduce Revised Victims'
Rights Amendment, supra note 32 (provides the most recent version of the VRA).
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necessarily have been prevented had the VRA been enacted, but
the possibility of its positive influence is certainly a viable one. If
the VRA would not have prevented Long's attack, it would at
least have provided her with a sense of peace in knowing that she
had an adequate say in the process and had done all she could to
see that justice was served in regards to the event that changed
her life. Long should not have to experience the feeling of being
a victim twice over.
The personal experience of Collene Campbell is an addi-
tional vivid and disturbing example of our need to prevent
double victimization. Campbell's son was murdered, and her
treatment throughout the criminal process resulted in her sec-
ond victimization. The defense subpoenaed her and her hus-
band to testify at trial, so they were evicted from the court
proceedings and sat in the hallway outside the courtroom
throughout the proceedings. The case subsequently reached the
appellate court, which released the defendants. Unlike more
than forty of the defendants' friends and family members, no
one informed the Campbells that an appeal was in process or
that the defendants had been released.45 The Deputy Attorney
General's response to Campbell's lack of notification was that
notification to a victim's family is "unimportant because a vic-
tim's family just doesn't understand the proceedings."4 6
Experiences of victims like that of Christine Long and Col-
lene Campbell need to be prevented. Victims do not deserve to
feel like mere witnesses to their attacks or as pieces of evidence at
trial. Their input and society's respect for their situation are
integral to the determination of justice. For these basic reasons,
the VRA is worthy of serious consideration.
C. Restoring Balance
Legislative attention to the victim has indeed improved in
the last decade, but it has not reached the point where the vic-
tim's rights are on par with the defendant's. This is a major argu-
ment that VRA advocates stress. After President Reagan's Task
Force presented its sixty-eight proposals for change, positive
advancements were made on behalf of governments and private
and community organizations for victims. In May 1986, the
Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs published
45. Kathleen Kalaher, Note, The Proposed Victim's Rights Amendment: Taking
a Bite Out of Crime or a Dog With No Teeth, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 317, 355 n.3
(1997).
46. Id. at n.2 (citing Victims Bill of Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 52
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 104th Cong. 33 (1996)).
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President's Task Force on Victims of Crime: Four Years Later. This
report by the Task Force was a very positive one. While Chair-
man Herrington's remarks in the 1982 Final Report rang with frus-
tration and an urgent call to action for the neglected victim, her
remarks in Four Years Later were quite the contrary. Herrington
commended President Reagan, stating that after the creation of
the Task force, "the Nation began to listen and respond" and
after the Final Report, "[t]here is much progress to celebrate"
because of changes at the local, state and federal levels of
government.
47
The Task Force listed eighteen laws advancing the rights of
victims and reported that before 1982, only Washington,
Nebraska and Oklahoma had passed a majority of these laws.
After 1982, twenty-seven more states met this standard.4 s In her
address to the President, Herrington was positive and praisewor-
thy but noticeably did not concede that reform for the victim was
complete. Rather, Herrington explained that it was progressing
47. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME:
FOUR YEARS LATER ii-iii (1986) [hereinafter FOUR YEARS LATER].
48. Id. at iv, v, 4. See pages iv-v for a map of states creating legislative
mandates for crime victims. The following is the Task Force's list of eighteen
laws. Each is followed first by the number of states that had implemented it pre-
1982, and then the number of states that had implemented it as of July 1985:
Enacting comprehensive laws that include a majority of the reforms
below, 4, 31;
Requiring a victim impact statement at sentencing, 8, 39;
Victim allocution at sentencing, 3, 19;
Permitting victim input into key prosecutorial decisions, 1, 10;
Opening parole hearings, 6, 19;
Abolishing parole, 5, 8;
Requiring that victim be notified of crucial developments in case, 2,
27;
Keeping victim counseling records confidential, 6, 20;
Not disclosing addresses and phone numbers of victims, 0, 5;
Allowing hearsay at preliminary hearings, 23, 26;
Assuring prompt property return, 4, 20;
Protecting victims from intimidation and harassment, 4, 27;
Providing separate and secure waiting rooms, 1, 17;
Checking people who work with children for a history of sex offense
convictions, 1, 20;
Mandating restitution to victims as part of sentence, 8, 29;
Providing funds for services to all victims of crime, 7, 28;
Preventing criminals from profiting from the sale of their stories, 14,
32; and
Victim compensation, 37, 43.
Of the eighteen laws, implementing the requirement of victim impact state-
ments at sentencing created the most change, from eight states pre-1982 to
thirty-nine states as of July 1985; abolishing parole received the least change,
from five states pre-1982 to eight states as of July 1985. Id. at 4.
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and remained a crucial priority, especially in light of the fact that
"[in 1985] more than 35 million Americans were victims of
crime" and "[a]lthough crime has decreased, the chance of
being a victim of violent crime is still greater than that of being
injured in a traffic accident."49 Additionally, in 1999, an analysis
of the expansion of victim participation in the criminal justice
system during the fifteen years after the President's Task Force
on Victims of Crime found that while the victim has indeed been
reintroduced in a participatory role, the victim once had a more
dominant role and VRA advocates feel that the victim's role is
still not broad enough.50
The fact that Herrington urged for the continual progres-
sion of victims' rights fifteen years ago, and that today the VRA
remains a subject of debate in Congress, illustrates how long the
struggle for victims' rights has taken place. The balance between
the victim and defendant remains skewed, and methods alterna-
tive to a federal VRA have inadequately attempted to remedy this
problem.
1. Alternative Methods of Protection are Inadequate
Providing victims with rights through the form of a constitu-
tional amendment is necessary not only because protecting vic-
tims is inherently good, but also because it is the only way to
create a balance of rights between victims and their offenders.
Federal statutes do not carry the same weight as constitutional
amendments, and different state constitutions and statutes pro-
tect victims' rights to varying degrees. A VRA would remedy
these inadequacies, creating floor requirements for victims'
rights.
The imbalance between victims' and defendants' rights per-
sists despite the fact that all states statutorily protect victims'
rights in some manner, and state constitutional victims' rights
amendments exist in more than half of states.5 While these
amendments are helpful to the victim's cause, they are insuffi-
cient to equate the victim's rights with the defendant's. Not only
is the effectiveness of state mandates questionable, but as long as
defendants have federal constitutional guarantees and their vic-
49. Id. at iii.
50. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process:
Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON
CraM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 21, 105 (1999).
51. DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, The Rights of Crime
Victims-Does Legal Protection Make a Difference?, at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/
173839.txt (Dec. 1998). See Stearman, supra note 12, at app. A, n.5 (list of state
victims' rights amendments, their dates of passage and their electoral support).
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tims do not, the victim is not on an equal playing ground. As one
victim who has experienced this disadvantage articulated, "They
explained the defendant's constitutional rights to the nth
degree. They couldn't do this and they couldn't do that because
of his constitutional rights. And I wondered what mine were.
And they told me, I haven't got any. "52
VRA critics argue that a federal amendment is not necessary
because states can provide for victims rights in their constitu-
tions. Wisconsin Senator Russell Feingold, for example, argues
that it is unnecessary to amend the Constitution to protect vic-
tims when we can accomplish the same goal through state consti-
tutions and federal statutes.53 Feingold explains that twenty-nine
states have victims' rights amendments, all states have statutes
protecting victims, and while others disagree, he believes these
provisions are adequate and effective means of protecting
victims.
54
The problem with Feingold's assertion is that even despite
state provisions or federal statutes enacted for the protection of
crime victims, these provisions are not strictly followed, so the
imbalance of rights persists. Former U.S. Attorney General Janet
Reno reinforced the existence of this problem in her statement
that "efforts to secure victims' rights through means other than a
constitutional amendment have proved less than fully ade-
quate."55 The floor requirements created by a VRA would pro-
vide adequate protection of victims' rights no matter what state a
victim was in when he or she was attacked.
An example of the inadequacy of state provisions is provided
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the issue of notice, and
also by the enforcement of the Utah Rights of Crime Victims Act.
The DOJ reported that "[w]hile the majority of states mandate
advance notice to crime victims of criminal proceedings and pre-
trial release, many have not implemented mechanisms to make
such notice a reality."56 Similarly, the Utah Rights of Crime Vic-
tims Act, which ensures victims "the right to be heard at all
important hearings related to criminal cases," also has not mate-
52. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 114.
53. Russell Feingold, Opening Statement on "The Victims' Rights Amendment,"
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/32499rf.htm (Mar. 24, 1999).
54. Id.
55. Twist, supra note 7.
56. Id.
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rialized.57 According to Professor Paul Cassell, Utah's act has
proven to be "a meaningless paper promise." 8
A research project by the National Center for Victims of
Crime came to a similar conclusion. It analyzed state statutory
protection of victims' rights in two states with strong protection
and two with weak protection. The study consisted of gathering
information from victims including whether they were afforded
and informed of their rights, whether they were adequately noti-
fied of victim services, whether they received restitution, what
losses they suffered because of the crime committed against
them and how they rated their satisfaction with the criminal jus-
tice procedures and their representatives.59 The researchers con-
cluded that strong legal protection produces positive results for
victims, but even in states with this strong protection, "some vic-
tims are not afforded their rights."6 ° This illustrates that state
statutes and constitutional amendments alone are insufficient in
guaranteeing victims' rights.
Even if state provisions proved effective, the imbalance in
federal constitutional rights would remain a tremendous obstacle
for victims. For this reason, VRA advocates such as NVCAN Co-
Chairperson, Roberta Roper, promote the argument set forth by
President Clinton in June, 1996, when he announced his support
for the VRA:
When a judge balances defendants' rights in the Federal
Constitution against victims' rights in a statute or state con-
stitution, the defendants' rights almost always prevail.
That's just how the law works today. We need to level the
playing field. This is not about depriving people accused
of crimes of their legitimate rights, including the presump-
tion of innocence; this is about simple fairness. When a
judge balances the rights of the accused and the rights of
the victim, we want the rights of the victim to get equal
weight.61
When President Clinton stated that the VRA is not about
depriving the accused of their rights but merely equalizing their
rights with that of the victims, he synthesized a key point. The
VRA does not diminish defendants' rights. It ensures that both
57. Geoffrey Fattah, Victims Rights Act is Put to the Test, DESERET NEWS, Oct.
4, 2001, at B01.
58. Id.
59. KILPATRICK ET AL., supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. NVCAN Letter to President Clinton, supra note 29 (In this May 2,
2000 letter to President Clinton, Roberta Roper quotes what President Clinton
said in June 1996).
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victims and defendants have rights, so courts can reach just
results. Preserving the rights of the accused against powers of
the state, along with the practice of public prosecution, are two
important principles of American criminal justice that should
not be compromised. As Steven Twist explains, however, these
two "good and perfect" things must be tempered, lest their
excess destroy balance.62 Twist refers to the rights of the accused
and public prosecution as possible "seeds of destruction" because
they have resulted in the diminished role of the victim, neglect-
ing the victim's pain and treating victims like pieces of evi-
dence.63 The VRA would help prevent this result.
2. Victims' Rights Properly Belong in the Constitution
No one denies the sacredness of the Constitution and our
need to respect it. Opponents of the VRA argue that the amend-
ment lowers the integrity of the Constitution. Russell Feingold,
for example, asserts that his "great respect for the Constitution"
is further motivation not to support the VRA because "it trivial-
izes the great and historic governing document of our demo-
cratic system when we so easily turn to the amendment process to
address contemporary and often transient policy problems."64
The VRA advocates' response to this argument is that victims'
rights rise to the same level of importance as constitutionally
guaranteed rights, so rather than "watering down" the Constitu-
tion, they are being placed where they properly belong.
While Feingold's point has merit in that numerous amend-
ments are probably proposed for political posturing, the VRA
should not be categorized as one of them. The problem of vic-
tims lacking constitutional protection of their rights has existed
for decades since the extinction of private prosecutions so it can-
not properly be characterized as a "transient" political problem.
Furthermore, the VRA addresses basic human rights and is there-
fore more akin to amendments related to slavery and suffrage, as
asserted by Chief Justice Barajas and Scott Alexander Nelson.6"
62. Twist, supra note 7.
63. Id.
64. Feingold, supra note 53. Feingold argues that the VRA contributes to
the "disturbing trend" of an increase in the number of proposed amendments
to the Constitution. He points out that "(jin the 207 year history of the US
Constitution, only 27 amendments have been ratified-just 17 since the Bill of
Rights was ratified in 1791." In light of these facts, Feingold laments that the
past few Congresses have introduced hundreds of amendments, illustrating a
lessening of our regard for the Constitution. Id.
65. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 10, at 21.
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Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe articulates well
the argument that the VRA relates to fundamental human rights:
I've been very reluctant to see the Constitution amended.
I'm one of those people who thinks it should be amended
only in very rare circumstances, but we're dealing here
with a fundamental principle of human rights, unlike just a
policy preference, and we're dealing with something that
isn't just like a wish list, you know, wish the budget to be
balanced. We're dealing with a thing that can be written,
and it has to be written with care so that it is enforceable in
a practical way, without distorting the structure of our gov-
ernment or trampling on other people's rights. So I do
think it belongs in our fundamental national law.6
6
The victim's point of view coincides with this scholar's.
Christine Long also explains that the rights stipulated in the VRA
are fundamental, and as the supreme law of our land, the federal
Constitution is the proper place for these rights to be guaran-
teed.67 The VRA provides for rights as basic as notice. Why
should victims be denied a constitutional guarantee for notice of
public proceedings relating to the crime committed against
them, or of their offender's release or escape from custody?
Even in 1976, former U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell
voiced the need for a "Miranda-type" program for victims in
order to address their plight and to ensure the integrity of our
judicial system.68 Brownell asserted that anyone who interacts
with victims would be unsurprised that the victim has difficulty
being informed by criminal courts.69 He noted that the criminal
system is "failing to provide the complainant with the most basic
service of all," which includes an explanation of his rights, a con-
tact person for information or simply directions on how to
recover property in police custody or navigate his way through
the courthouse. Furthermore, Brownell said, "No one thanks
[the complainant] for being a good citizen and withstanding
what he has endured."7" The VRA provides for these fundamen-
tal rights, and by equalizing victims' rights with defendants', it
adds an important human aspect to the justice system, helping to
prevent people from becoming victimized twice. The benefits
66. Id. at 21-22 (quoting NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Making Amends
(PBS television broadcast, June 25, 1996), available at Online Newshour, Mak-
ing Amends, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/june96/victims-rights-
6-25.html (interview with Laurence Tribe)).
67. Long Testimony, supra note 8.
68. See generally BROWNELL, supra note 11.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. at 21-22.
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the VRA would provide outweigh the burdens its opponents fear,
and this argument is enhanced by evidence that VRA opponents'
primary fears are unfounded.
III. FEARs UNFOUNDED
Based on studies, fears that increased attention on victims'
participation in the criminal process will detract from defend-
ants' rights prove unfounded. An example of this is a study con-
ducted on the effect of victim-impact statutes in thirty-six states.
The study led to the conclusion that the statutes' effect on
criminals' sentence type and duration were only negligible.71
This coincides with the U.S. Supreme Court's 1991 decision in
Payne v. Tennessee, where the Court held that the defendant's
Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punish-
ment did not prohibit the presentation of victim-impact evidence
to a capital sentencing jury.72 In this case, Pervis Payne stabbed a
woman and her two-year-old daughter to death and severely
wounded the woman's three-year-old son, Nicholas. Payne had
four witnesses testify before the capital sentencing jury (his par-
ents, girlfriend, and psychologist) and their testimonies did not
provide insight on the brutality of his crime. The Court noted
that in contrast to Payne's witnesses' testimonies, Nicholas'
grandmother's testimony provided the only victim-impact evi-
dence during Payne's sentencing phase.73 The Court further
stated that the grandmother's descriptions "illustrated quite
poignantly some of the harm that Payne's killing had caused,"
and that "there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear
in mind that harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating
evidence introduced by the defendant."74
The study of state victim-impact statutes, as well as the
Supreme Court's decision in Payne, illustrate that the victim's
participation in a case does not interfere with the defendant's
rights. This speaks to the viability of a federal VRA. It also rein-
71. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 10, at 18.
72. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
73. Id. at 826.
74. Id. The court also noted the Supreme Court of Tennessee's finding
that:
It is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say that
at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the
background, character and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in
this case), without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said
that bears upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the
victims.
Id. (citing State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990)).
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forces the results of a study on how legislation has affected the
victim's right to be heard at sentencing. The results showed that
legislation "[has] neither matched the highest expectations of its
advocates nor realized the worst fears of its critics."7 5
The fears voiced by opponents of the VRA are similar to
those voiced regarding state victims' rights amendments. An
extensive survey on state victims' rights amendments illustrates
that state appellate courts have effectively dealt with the fear that
the victims' rights will hinder that of the defendant. In light of
the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights and the vic-
tim's lack thereof, the survey revealed that "[w]hen faced with
legitimate conflicting rights, state appellate courts have consist-
ently acknowledged that the liberty rights of defendants are
paramount."76
Gore v. State,77 for example, addressed the issue of a victim's
right not to be excluded from a public proceeding. In this case,
a defendant appealed on grounds that the court should have
sequestered a homicide victim's stepmother from the court pro-
ceedings. The court found that the defendant was not
prejudiced but warned that victims' relatives' general right to
attend trials "must yield to the defendant's right to a fair trial."7 8
This case illustrates two important concepts. First, it exemplifies
how the current system places defendants' rights above that of
the victim. Second, it also shows that a victim can be present
without infringing upon a defendant's rights or compromising
our criminal procedure.
The VRA provides victims with the right not to be excluded
from public proceedings. Therefore, a conflict of interest arises
when the victim is also a sequestered witness. The defense may
fear that the victim's presence in the courtroom will unfairly
influence the jury, but this problem can be solved by implement-
ing practical solutions. For example, courts can plan for victims
to testify before other witnesses, or they can have the testimonies
of victim-witnesses videotaped prior to the trial.7"
Another fear VRA opponents have is that victims are too
emotional, so their input in the criminal process will negatively
affect the prosecutor by "second-guessing" him and dictating his
75. Tobolowsky, supra note 50, at 81.
76. Stearman, supra note 12, at 62.
77. 599 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1992).
78. Id. at 986. Four years after Gore, in Martinez v. State, 664 So.2d 1034
(Fla. 1996), the Florida District Court of Appeal held that a victim's presence in
court during opening statements should not have been allowed, but it resulted
in a harmless error. The court affirmed the conviction. Id.
79. Kalaher, supranote 45, at 340.
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policy decisions.8" In reality, the VRA does not lend victims free-
dom to be heard when they should not. The victim's right to be
heard can be restricted if "compelling necessity dictates" and
cannot "be construed to provide grounds for a new trial or to
authorize any claim for damages."81 In other words, as Steven
Twist relates, the VRA "extends victims the right to be heard
where they have useful information to provide."82 Victims may
attend the trial, talk to the judge or testify before the parole
board at specified sentencing procedures and conditional
releases, and the only time a victim will speak to a jury is when he
is a witness who can provide evidence through testimony.83 This
participation is fair.84
Likewise, the fear that providing victim's rights will essen-
tially lead to the addition of a second prosecutor, or third party,
to the criminal system that will "[raise] havoc with our traditional
adversarial system" is also unfounded. 5 It is true that our crimi-
naljustice system is bipolar, with a plaintiff and defendant as par-
ties, and it is also based on the presumption that crimes are
committed against the public. However, who is to say that
adding a stronger role for the victim will so interfere with our
criminal process that the accused will find themselves at an
increased and unfair disadvantage? VRA opponents argue that
the amendment will convert our system into one that serves as a
victim's tool for private vengeance.86 One opponent said the
VRA "replaces the healthy attitude of 'get over it and get on with
80. King, supra note 8, at 359.
81. See Kyl/Feinstein to Introduce Revised Victims' Rights Amendment, supra
note 32 (sections 2 and 3 of the most recent version of the VRA).
82. Twist, supra note 7.
83. U.S. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) Holds Media Availability, FDCH Political
Transcripts LEXIS (July 18, 2000).
84. But see A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Crime Victims: Hear-
ings on S.J Res. 3 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaiy, 106th Cong. (Mar. 24,
1999) (statement of Beth A. Wilkinson, federal prosecutor). Beth Wilkinson
was a prosecutor in the Oklahoma City bombing case, where the prosecution
accepted the plea bargain of a key witness, Michael Fortier. This helped to
convict Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, who were most responsible for the
bombing. Wilkinson claims that the VRA would have hindered the conviction.
She said that if the victims had had the right to be heard by the court at the
time of the plea bargain, "many would have vigorously and emotionally" chal-
lenged it. The problem in this case was that the prosecutors could not explain
the importance of Fortier's plea to the victims because of the secrecy rules
regarding grand juries. Id. at 19.
85. Roger Pilon, A Constitutional Amendment to Protect the Rights of Crime
Victims, Statement before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, at http://www.
cato.org/testimony/ct-rp042898.html (Apr. 28, 1998).
86. Ed Quillen, The Victims Rights Amendment: Fashionable but Stupid, DEN-
VER POSt, Sept. 10, 2000, at H-03.
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your life' with the unhealthy view that 'until I get closure on this,
I have an absolute right to whine on national network news every
night."'87 But VRA advocates are not seeking a means of ven-
geance. They are looking for balance. If defendants already
have constitutionally guaranteed rights, providing victims with
the same will place the two on equal ground, rather than main-
taining the status quo of favoring one over the other.
IV. A CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE
Implementing the VRA presents issues about how this
change will affect the character of the American criminal justice
system as a whole. This section illustrates that the VRA's effect
would be an increased focus on restitutionary principles as well
as the retributivist theory of punishment. This influence has
important meaning and positive aspects to offer. Meanwhile, it
neither represents drastic change to our current penal theory
nor inconsistency with Christian values.
A. Restitutionary Principles
It is a serious matter that the VRA contributes to offering a
modification of our view of the criminal justice system by focus-
ing more on restitutionary principles and less on punishment
and deterrence. However, in light of the current emphasis on
defendants' rights, this change in perspective deserves serious
consideration. Paul Cassell explains that "over time .... atten-
tion to the rights of criminal suspects has turned into a preoccu-
pation, an all-consuming task that left courts and others little
time or inclination to consider other competing interests."88 He
also notes that the problem is compounded by "a philosophy that
society's interests in prosecution are different from the victims'
interests, which has further shifted attention away from vic-
tims." " This shifting of attention or denial of standing for the
victim is "recent and aberrational" to American as well as foreign
criminal procedure, suggesting that a return towards a more
restitutionary-oriented system is a viable means of providing vic-
tims with the rights they deserve.9 °
Originally, American colonists followed English common
law traditions that included private prosecutions and the philoso-
87. Id.
88. Cassell, supra note 7, at 1457.
89. Id.
90. Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the
Victim, 14 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAw 839, 839 (1997).
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phy that crimes were injuries to individuals rather than the
state. 9' Reintegrating criminals into society was an important
philosophy, and restitution was thought to have the positive
effects of both encouraging offenders' rehabilitation and simul-
taneously providing relief to victims.9 2 Over time, the concept of
a public prosecutor evolved in colonial society, and its origin has
been described as "an historical enigma."93 The introduction of
public prosecution, as we see today, replaced the practice of pri-
vate prosecution that existed at the time of America's first
settlers.
In foreign countries, the transition from private to public
prosecution did not occur. In England, private prosecution
remains essential to the British concept of protection of liberty.94
In France, victims may seek the civil action of damages in crimi-
nal courts, thereby efficiently lowering costs and assuring consis-
tent court decisions.95 This is the most common method by
which countries provide restitution for crime victims.9 6 In the
Netherlands, victims do not have the right to initiate criminal
trials, but they may appeal to the court if prosecution does not
take place. They may also be represented by counsel and have
the general right to records.97
So, while the American criminal process began with restitu-
tionary aims akin to that of its European counterparts, America
broke away from this philosophy after its revolution and replaced
it with a system that focuses on punishment and deterrence.
This change has been attributed to the "the increasing urbaniza-
tion and mobility of the population [that] brought about the
demise of community kinship."98 If a victim in the United States
seeks damages, he must endure the burden and high costs of
civil law, while maintaining a very limited participatory role in
91. Id. at 841. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 20-30.
92. Cellini, supra note 90, at 845.
93. Id. at 842. The concept of a public prosecutor did not have roots in
English law. Two theories of its derivation are that it is an adaptation of the
Dutch colonial settlements' schout ("a combination of sheriff, public prosecutor,
and financial agent for the Dutch West India Company") or the French prosecu-
tor de roi (king's prosecutor). Both of these offices, in their native lands, did not
deny the victim the right to restitution or the right to bring civil claims in crimi-
nal proceedings. Id.
94. Id. at 843.
95. Id. at 843-44. See also DR. STEPHEN SCHAFER, RESTITUTION TO VicTIMs
OF CRIME 21 (1960). Greece and Canada share this same characteristic of
allowing claims for restitution to be brought simultaneously with criminal
offenses. Id. at 57, 60.
96. Id. at 103.
97. Cellini, supra note 90, at 844.
98. Id. at 846.
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the criminal proceedings related to the same case. Today, U.S.
federal law, along with the legal systems of India, Pakistan, and
New Zealand, is among the few that "completely separate restitu-
tion to victims of crime from the criminal law, leaving the ques-
tion of restitution to be dealt with entirely as a problem of the
civil law."99
Allowing the victim a role in the criminal justice process will
reapply restitutionary principles to American criminal law. Crim-
inology scholar Stephen Schafer explains that restitution and the
idea of addressing victim neglect bear a relationship with one
another, and that merging victimology with penology can refine
the concept of punishment in a positive manner:
[I]t does seem to be possible to establish a close relation
between... the criminal and his victim. Not pity towards
the victim, but appreciation of his claim is needed. Not
thirst for revenge against the criminal, but a clearer under-
standing of his deed would help his reform and rehabilita-
tion. Restitution might give emphasis to the fact that
crime construes a relation not only between the criminal
and society, but also between the criminal and his victim.
The victim is not just simply the cause of the criminal pro-
cedure, but has a major part to play in the search for crimi-
nal justice.' 00
B. Theories of Punishment
Besides introducing restitutionary principles to the Ameri-
can criminal justice system, the VRA further shapes the theoreti-
cal framework of our system of punishment in terms of
utilitarianism and retribution-the two major perspectives of
punishment that have influenced our system of justice. Analyz-
ing these theories illustrates that implementing the VRA
advances the retributivist theory, and this shift in perspective can
be a healthy one for our criminal justice system.
1. A Brief History on the Development of American Theories
of Punishment
The American criminal justice system is based in utilitarian-
ism but has retributivist influences. Today's criminal system is
the product of utilitarian theory that gained permanence in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.10 ' Utilitarianism
99. SCHAFER, supra note 95, at 103.
100. Id. at viii.
101. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (Aspen
Law & Business, 3d ed. 1996).
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focuses on future consequences, viewing crime prevention as an
ultimate goal of punishment that is realized by rehabilitation,
deterrence and incapacitation.10 2 The utilitarian perspective
views punishment as justifiable as long as it effectively advances
the best interests of society.' Retributivist theory came to the
forefront in America in the 1970s, when society became frus-
trated with the failure of utilitarianism's preventionist strate-
gies. 104 Contrary to utilitarianism, retributivism represents "the
idea that criminals should be punished because they deserve
it.' 0 5 Retributivist theory is often explained in terms of the ben-
efits and burdens associated with complying with or violating
rules. Scholar Herbert Morris, for example, explains that
retributivism is reasonable and just because punishing an
offender equalizes the distribution of benefits and burdens
between the victim and the offender." 6 The results of the
retributivist influence in America included more determinate
sentencing that was also less discretionary and less focused upon
rehabilitation.10 7 These changes often yielded overly harsh and
ineffective sentencing.108
By the 1980s, a new educative theory of punishment
emerged as retributivists considered whether their ideals wrongly
exploited offenders for the sake of making a political statement
of respect for victims.10 9 Consequently, they adopted the idea
that punishment included rehabilitative principles and that soci-
ety should make efforts to reintegrate offenders. The educative
theory includes a paternalistic aspect in its view that the purpose
of punishment is to teach lessons in morality. 10
102. Id. at 35-38.
103. Id. at 35.
104. John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory
of Criminal Justice, in KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 37-38.
105. Id. at 37.
106. Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence, in KAPLAN ET AL., supra note
101, at 75.
107. See Braithwaite & Pettit, supra note 104, at 38.
108. Id.
109. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 91.
110. Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in KAPLAN
ET AL., supra note 101, at 92; Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment,
in KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 93. See also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT
AND MODERN SociEmT 292 (1990) (Garland suggests that punishment should be
viewed as "a work of social justice and moral education rather than penal policy.
And to the extent that punishment is deemed unavoidable, it should be viewed
as a morally expressive undertaking rather than a purely instrumental one.").
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2. The VRA, Retributivism and the American
Criminal Justice System
The VRA is retributivist in nature because it relates to the
idea of equalizing the benefits and burdens between victims and
their offenders and also to the idea of punishing offenders for
just deserts. The primary aim of the VRA is to provide a balance
of constitutionally protected rights between victims and their
offenders, and in this sense, it represents an equalization of ben-
efits and burdens. The VRA relates to punishing offenders for
just deserts by allowing victims participatory roles in the criminal
process. This participatory role includes victim testimony at
court proceedings. Since the jury may consider the victim testi-
mony in its assessment of the offender's punishment, the VRA
relates to offenders receiving just deserts for the harm they
caused.
However, simply because it is retributivist in nature does not
mean the VRA can be characterized as a tool that serves vengeful
purposes, as some opponents claim.111 Professor Jean Hampton
articulates this point well. Hampton endorses retribution, find-
ing that it "is importantly different from the vengefulness that
emanates from malice."1 12 Hampton acknowledges that people
confuse retribution and revenge, but that the two are critically
distinct:
The vengeful hater does not respect but aims to diminish
the worth of the offender ... in order to elevate herself, a
strategy that I have argued is self-defeating. The retribu-
tivist, on the other hand, aims to defeat the wrongdoer in
order to annul the evidence provided by the crime of his
relative superiority. The retributivist is interested in assert-
ing moral truth; hence he is always mindful of, and respect-
ful towards, the value of his wrongdoer. Indeed, the
retributivist who accepts an egalitarian theory of worth has
no interest in doing anything to change the value of either
the wrongdoer or the victim. Instead, he is interested in
using his domination to deny the wrongdoer's prior claim
or superiority.1 13
As Hampton asserts, retribution is associated with moral
truth and equal worth. The VRA's retributivist influence on the
American criminal justice system includes these values. Victim
participation in the criminal process acknowledges that the vic-
111. See Quillen, supra note 86, at H-03; King, supra note 8, at 359.
112. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 122
(1988).
113. Id. at 137-38.
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tim has "value" that his or her offender diminished, and that the
victim's true "worth" must be restored to reach justice. By
allowing victims the right to be heard, a vital perspective on a
crime is included in the totality of evidence presented at court,
increasing the probability that courts will reach results that are
just to the victim, offender and society. If a "compelling necessity
dictates" that a victim not testify, the VRA provides for this
exception. 14
By allowing victims to reestablish their "value" in order to
assert a "moral truth," the VRA communicates a message to the
offender that his or her claim to superior worth is harmful and
wrong. In this respect, the VRA reflects the educative theory of
criminal punishment, which is the combination of the retribu-
tivist and rehabilitative theories that can be used to characterize
American punitive theory today. The educative theory "bring[s]
the criminal to understand the nature and implications of her
crime; to repent that crime and thus, by willing her own punish-
ment as a penance which can expiate her crime, to reconcile her-
self with the Right and with her community."" 5 Because the
VRA has an educative theory influence, it is consistent with the
current American theory of punishment and will not materially
alter the country's penal theory as a whole.
Furthermore, the VRA's retributivist nature is reconcilable
with Christian values of love and forgiveness. Professor Hampton
explains that "retribution is not a form of hatred at all, so that (as
Jesus may have been trying to say) the claims of love need not
be violated by the claims of justice, or vice versa." '16 Hampton
goes on to say that a victim can seek retribution and still forgive
his or her offender because "[f]orgiveness is a change of heart
towards the wrongdoer in which one drops any emotions of
hatred or resentment towards him and his deed, takes a pro-atti-
tude towards him and is disposed (under most conditions) to
make the offer of reconciliation."1 7 In light of this explanation,
a victim can participate in the criminal justice process and be at
peace with the Christian doctrines to "love your enemies" and
"forgive others."1 18
114. See Kyl/Feinstein to Introduce Revised Victims' Rights Amendment, supra
note 32 (most recent version of the VRA).
115. R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments, in KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 101, at
94.
116. MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 112, at 122.
117. Id. at 157.
118. Pacem, Dei Munus Pulcherrimum (Encyclical of Pope Benedict XV on
Peace and Christian Reconciliation), at http://www.saint-mike.org/Library/
Papal-Library (May 23, 1920). See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Catholic Social Thought
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CONCLUSION
As related in this Note, constitutionally guaranteeing funda-
mental victim's rights through the enactment of the VRA is a
valid solution to improving the status of the victim in our crimi-
nal justice system. Over the years, the VRA advocates have
fought through repeated revisions and garnered continual wide-
spread, bipartisan support for the materialization of this amend-
ment. The momentum of the victims' rights movement has led
to positive advancements for victims, raising the public con-
sciousness of their status. In light of the need to respect victims
of violence in our society and the fact that victims are being vic-
timized a second time by the criminal process itself, efforts for
the victims' cause must persist.
The nature of the VRA merits a constitutional amendment
because the rights it affords are basic, fundamental human
rights. Furthermore, as Cassell notes, criminal procedure has
been "nationalized" so that "the coin of the criminal justice
realm is constitutional rights. Without such rights, victims inevi-
tably become second-class citizens in the courts."' " Considering
that alternative methods of protection for victims' rights have
proven inadequate and many of the fears surrounding the VRA
are unfounded, reintroducing the victim to the criminal process
through the VRA is a logical solution.
While the VRA does affect the theoretical framework of the
American criminal justice system by providing restitutionary and
retributive influences, this effect is neither drastic nor detrimen-
tal, especially since it coincides with the current educative theory
of punishment. Adding a restitutionary slant to our criminal pro-
cedure will be a healthy change, benefiting victims and temper-
ing our stress on defendants' rights without unjustly infringing
upon them. The retributive aspects of the VRA contribute to our
society obtaining justice by reaching moral truths related to just
deserts and what Professor Hampton describes as an equalization
between the value of the victim and the offender.120
In the words of ChiefJustice Richard Barajas and Scott Alex-
ander Nelson, the change the enactment of the VRA will create
"is not revolutionary. It is simply a move toward reestablishing a
proper balance between the rights of the accused and the rights
on Law as a Tool for Building Justice, 46 CATH. U.L. REv. 1163, 1172 (1997)
(explaining that love defines justice, echoing Christ's teachings "that the entire
law is satisfied in the love of God and the love of neighbor.").
119. Cassell, supra note 26.
120. MuRPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 112, at 137-38.
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of the crime victim.' 1 21 This straightforward goal of creating bal-
ance is a worthwhile and necessary one that our criminal justice
system can and should strive to achieve.
121. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 10, at 24.
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